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Abstract
For descriptions of cognitive processes, including process models for research data provenance and
simulation workow metadata, a formal notation is developed on the basis of the foundational ontolog-
ical paradigm of mereosemiotics, i.e., the combination of mereotopology with Peircean semiotics. To
demonstrate the viability of the approach, this is applied to extend the pre-existing OWL ontology for
a physicalistic interpretation of modelling and simulation – interoperability infrastructure (PIMS-II) by a
modal rst-order logic axiomatization.
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1. Introduction
Understanding and characterizing research workows, i.e., cognitive processes that yield a
research outcome, is essential to reproducibility [1, 2, 3, 4]. Moreover, it is the reliability
of the employed processes and procedures that motivates trust in the research outcome, cf. the
discussion of epistemic grounding by Williams [5], of warrant transmission by Symons and
Alvarado [6], and of computational reliabilism by Durán et al. [7, 8]. Accordingly, research
data infrastructures can only support reproducibility and reliability if provenance metadata are
available and can be exchanged in a standardized form [9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15]: “The quality
of metadata determines the reusability,” as Wulf et al. [15] assert. Consequently, much of the
recent work on semantic artefacts in engineering, natural sciences, and scientic computing
has focused on research workow descriptions; in materials modelling, in particular, a system
of connected standardized provenance descriptions at multiple levels has been developed,
encompassing MODA (“model data”) tables [16] for a semi-formal descriptive annotation of
simulation results targeting human-to-human communication, the ontology for simulation,
modelling, and optimization (OSMO) as a domain-ontology version of MODA [17, 18, 19], the
physicalistic interpretation of modelling and simulation – interoperability infrastructure (PIMS-II)
as a mid-level ontology for cognitive processes [20, 21], and process topology based approaches
from ProMo for mapping process models to Petri nets and high-level I/O notations [20].
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The elementary multiperspective material ontology (EMMO), which is work in progress and
available as a beta version,1 is used as a foundational ontology [22, 23, 24]. Both for the
present rst-order axiomatization of mereosemiotics and for PIMS-II, the associated OWL
implementation, many basic design choices exclusively serve the purpose of remaining close to
the EMMO, so that the present work can support EMMO-based interoperability in line with
objectives from the Horizon 2020 and Horizon Europe work programmes. Where there are
minor deviations from the EMMO approach, care has been taken to ensure that they do not
stand in the way of implementing straightforward crosswalks between the two ontologies that
work reliably for typical use cases. No attempt will be made here to provide a philosophical or
metaontological justication of nominalism, physicalism, Peirceanism, mereotopology, rejection
of the perdurant-endurant distinction, etc.; rst, because it is the EMMO developers who need
to be credited with designing the foundations of this paradigm [22, 23, 24], and second, because
some advantages and challenges pertaining to this approach have already been discussed
elsewhere [25, 26].
The semantic artefacts mentioned above jointly rely on combining mereotopology with
Peircean semiotics, i.e., on the foundational ontological paradigm of mereosemiotics [25]. The
present work proposes a system of axioms in modal rst-order logic for mereosemiotics. These
axioms concern cognitive processes in particular as well as cross-domain concepts and relations
provided by the PIMS-II mid-level ontology in general. The article is structured as follows:
Section 2 discusses mereotopology and the way in which nominalism, spatiotemporal monism,
continuity of spacetime, and linearity of time are implemented. Section 3 introduces the present
approach to formalizing Peircean semiotics, based on semiotic monism, coherently integrating it
with mereotopology. Section 4 addresses modal relations and propositions, giving an expression
to necessitism and mereotopological essentialism, and introduces the kinds of collectives that are
dened in PIMS-II; it also discusses the pre-existing system of mereosemiotic chain relations
from the VIMMP Primitives [18] (VIPRS) that is included in PIMS-II to support domain-to-




The following remarks are formally not part of the present axiomatization of mereosemiotics,
which is given in Sections 2.2 to 4.3. However, they may help to motivate the axioms and
provide a suggested interpretation for its concepts and relations on the basis of necessitism,
cf. the detailed discussion by Williamson [27], four-dimensionalism [28], and spatiotemporal
monism [25] as proposed, e.g., by Williams [29]; while Muller [30] does not use the term
spatiotemporal monism, he similarly proposes to rely on “space-time histories of objects as
primitive entities” instead of continuant-occurrent dualism.
It is proposed to construct the domain 𝛥 for the ontology as follows:2
1The name of that foundational ontology has recently changed, retaining the acronym “EMMO,” which had
originally been introduced to abbreviate European materials and modelling ontology.
2Alternatively, where it is benecial to rely on a model that is enumerable, the domain can also be constructed
1. R4 is given an interpretation as dimensionless spacetime, with the rst three coordinates
𝑞1, 𝑞2, 𝑞3 of some four-dimensional point q = (𝑞1, 𝑞2, 𝑞3, 𝑞4) ∈ R4 being understood as
spatial and the fourth coordinate 𝑞4 being understood as temporal.
2. 𝑆 ⊆ R4 is 4D-complete if and only if for each q ∈ 𝑆 there are linearly independent
r1, r2, r3, r4 ∈ R4 such that q′ ∈ 𝑆 for all q′ − q =
∑︀
1≤𝑖≤4 𝑣𝑖r𝑖 where 0 < 𝑣𝑖 ≤ 1.
3. 𝑆 ⊆ R4 is simple if and only if it consists of nitely many connected components.
4. 𝑆 ⊂ R4 is 4D-delimited if and only if a) 𝑆 is a closed set and b) for some 𝑟 ∈ R,
(q′ − q)2 ≤ 𝑟2 for all q,q′ ∈ 𝑆 and c) 𝑆 and R4∖𝑆 are 4D-complete and simple.
5. 𝑆 ⊂ R4 is temporally closed if and only if {𝑞4 | q ∈ 𝑆} is a closed subset of R.
6. By some relation between physical and dimensionless spacetime, the physical universe is
mapped to the connected 4D-delimited set 𝜔 ⊂ R4, the actual and necessary (dimension-
less) universe; the employed relation should be such that its inverse, from 𝜔 to physical
spacetime, is surjective and preserves continuity if physical spacetime is continuous, or
adjacency if physical spacetime is discrete. It does not matter how exactly this is done as
long as 𝜔 is 4D-delimited and consists of a single connected component, and as long as 𝜔
is the dimensionless universe necessarily; accordingly, by the present construction, 𝜔 is a
continuum even if the physical universe is regarded as consisting of discrete elements.
As a closed set, 𝜔 includes its boundary, the three-dimensional hypersurface 𝛿𝜔 ⊂ 𝜔.
7. The domain of the ontology is 𝛥 = {𝑥 ⊂ 𝜔∖𝛿𝜔 | 𝑥 is 4D-delimited and temporally
closed}. The elements of𝛥 are that which exists; they are referred to as objects.3
8. An object 𝑥 ∈ 𝛥 is an item if it is a single connected component and a mereotopological
collective if it consists of multiple connected components; in the latter case, the (maximal)
connected components of 𝑥 are its mereotopological members.
9. For any two objects 𝑥, 𝑦 ∈ 𝛥, the criterion for proper parthood is Ṗ𝑥𝑦 ⇔ 𝑥 ⊂ 𝑦,
10. the criterion for temporal precedence is given by →˓t𝑥𝑦 ⇔ ∀q ∈ 𝑥 ∀q′ ∈ 𝑦 : 𝑞4 ≤ 𝑞′4,
11. two objects temporally coextend, ≡t𝑥𝑦, if and only if {𝑞4 | q ∈ 𝑥} = {𝑞′4 | q′ ∈ 𝑦},
12. and the criterion for spatiotemporal connectedness is C𝑥𝑦 ⇔ (𝑥 ∩ 𝑦) ̸= ∅.
Accordingly, for any 𝑥, 𝑦 ∈ 𝛥, their spatiotemporal fusion is an object, 𝑥∪𝑦 ∈ 𝛥. However, the
universe does not exist (𝜔 ̸∈ 𝛥), an empty object does not exist (∅ ̸∈ 𝛥), and the complements
of objects are not objects (𝑥 ∈ 𝛥 ⇒ 𝜔∖𝑥 ̸∈ 𝛥).
Ontological commitment, following Quine [33, paragraph 49], here extends exclusively to
individuals, namely, to objects as introduced above. That which exists is that which is accessible
to quantication in rst-order logic; this quantication is always over𝛥 which will be omitted
for brevity. The inverse relation of Q will be denoted by Q−, and the product notation QQ′
will be employed for chain relations such that QQ′𝑥𝑦 ⇔ ∃𝑧 (Q𝑥𝑧 ∧ Q′𝑧𝑦). Implementing
nominalism, existence is not attributed to concepts and relations, which are formalized here
as unary and binary predicates, not as individuals. However, textual labels corresponding
to concepts and relations, in particular, their internationalized resource identiers (IRIs), can
exist in the ontology; this construction is used in the OWL DL demonstrator implementation
PIMS-II [21].
by using Q everywhere instead of R.
3It is expected that research data infrastructures and digital platforms that employ the present ontology will
predominantly or exclusively deal with bona de objects as discussed by Vogt [31], which have bona de bound-
aries [32]; such entities are straightforwardly covered by the domain𝛥.
2.2. Spatiotemporal Connectedness and Proper Parthood
In the literature a great variety of potential axiomatizations ofmereotopology have been explosed
in detail [28, 30, 32, 34, 35]; the aim of the construction from Section 2.1 is to motivate axioms
that yield a strong mereotopology that is easy to handle in view of the application in Section 4.1,
mainly through a strong version of spatiotemporal monism [25, 29, 30]. Five relations4
constitute the basis of this mereotopology: isSpatiotemporallyConnectedWith (denoted C),
isProperPartOf (denoted Ṗ), isMereotopologicalMemberOf (denoted ≤̇ ), temporallyPrecedes
(denoted →˓t), and temporallyCoextendsWith (denoted ≡t). In particular, overlap can then be
constructed as Ṗ
−
Ṗ, the product ṖṖ
− ≡ ⊤Q is the complete relation, and Ṗ is idempotent, all of
which simplies the system ofmereosemiotic chain relations discussed in Section 4.1; necessitism
and mereotopological essentialism support the discussion of modal relations, cf. Section 4.2.
Spatiotemporal connectedness C is reexive and symmetric [34]
∀𝑥C𝑥𝑥 ∧ ∀𝑥𝑦(C𝑥𝑦 → C𝑦𝑥); (1)
nothing is connected with everything, but all objects are connected indirectly
∀𝑥∃𝑦 ¬C𝑥𝑦 ∧ ∀𝑥𝑦 C2𝑥𝑦; (2)
C2 ≡ ⊤Q is complete. C is constitutive of identity [34], proper parthood, and fusion [35]
∀𝑥𝑦 (∀𝑧(C𝑥𝑧 ↔ C𝑦𝑧) → 𝑥 = 𝑦) , (3)
∀𝑥𝑦
(︁
(∀𝑧 (C𝑥𝑧 → C𝑦𝑧) ∧ 𝑥 ̸= 𝑦) ↔ Ṗ𝑥𝑦
)︁
, (4)
∀x (∀𝑦 (𝜎𝑦x ↔ ∀𝑧(∨𝑖C𝑥𝑖𝑧 ↔ C𝑦𝑧)) ∧ ∃𝑦 𝜎𝑦x) ; (5)
fusion 𝜎 here takes multiple arguments, x = 𝑥1 · · ·𝑥𝑛 being a sequence of 𝑛 ≥ 1 variables.
Proper parthood Ṗ is asymmetric and transitive, everything is a proper part of something,
and ṖṖ
− ≡ ⊤Q is complete (any two objects “underlap,” i.e., are joint proper parts of a greater
object), all of which are deducible from Axioms (2), (4), and (5). As an expression of continuity
of spacetime5 and the strong supplementation principle [36],
∀𝑥𝑦
(︁
∀𝑧(Ṗ−Ṗ𝑥𝑧 → Ṗ−Ṗ𝑦𝑧) → Ṗ2𝑥𝑦
)︁
. (6)
The maximal items that are proper parts of a mereotopological collective are its members
∀𝑥𝑦
(︁(︁





and an object is an item6 if and only if it cannot be split into disconnected parts
∀𝑥 (∀𝑦𝑧(𝜎𝑥𝑦𝑧 → C𝑦𝑧) ↔ Item:𝑥) . (8)
4See the Appendix for a list of relations relevant to this work.
5By the construction from Section 2.1, this does not require actual physical spacetime to be continuous.
6See the Appendix for a list of concepts relevant to this work.
Temporal precedence →˓t is asymmetric and transitive
¬∃𝑥𝑦(→˓t𝑥𝑦 ∧ →˓t𝑦𝑥) ∧ ∀𝑥𝑦𝑧 ((→˓t𝑥𝑦 ∧ →˓t𝑦𝑧) → →˓t𝑥𝑧) , (9)





∀𝑥′(Ṗ𝑥′𝑥 → →˓t𝑥′𝑦) ∧ ∀𝑦′(Ṗ𝑦′𝑦 → →˓t𝑥𝑦′)
)︁)︁
; (10)
Axioms (9) and (10) entail that the relations Ṗ
−
Ṗ and →˓t are disjoint. Everything precedes
something, everything is preceded by something, and by linearity of time, any two objects
have proper parts that are in a temporal precedence relation with each other
∀𝑥∃𝑦 →˓t𝑥𝑦 ∧ ∀𝑥∃𝑦 →˓t𝑦𝑥 ∧ ∀𝑥𝑦∃𝑥′𝑦′
(︁
Ṗ𝑥′𝑥 ∧ Ṗ𝑦′𝑦 ∧ (→˓t𝑥′𝑦′ ∨ →˓t𝑦′𝑥′)
)︁
. (11)










so that it follows from Axioms (9) to (12) that ≡t and →˓t are disjoint. The chain ≡tṖ𝑥𝑦 (equiv-





Ṗ≡t𝑥𝑦) characterizes temporal overlap.
3. Cognitive Processes
3.1. Cognitive Steps as Peircean Triads
The present approach to formalizing steps of a cognitive process as triads, inspired by Peirce [37,
38, 39, 40] and more recently Sowa [41, 42] and Goldbeck et al. [22], is outlined7 in recent
work [20]. Representation of an object 𝑦 (referent) by a sign 𝑥 (representamen), denoted R𝑥𝑦,
is understood in terms of a triadic cognition 𝜅
∀𝜅(TriadicCognition:𝜅 ↔ ∃𝑒1𝑒2𝑒3 3𝜅𝑒1𝑒2𝑒3), (13)
∀𝜅𝑒1𝑒2𝑒3
(︁





i.e., a cognitive step that has three elements, above, 𝑒1, 𝑒2, and 𝑒3, where 3 is a quaternary pred-
icate relating the three elements to the cognition; Ė (isFirstElementIn), Ë (isSecondElementIn),
and
...
E (isThirdElementIn) relate individual elements to the cognition.
It is not explicitly required here for any of these elements to be unique. On the one hand,
Peirce’s formulations would suggest this where he speaks of “the sign,” “the object,” and “the
interpretant” [38]. On the other hand, Peirce also develops the understanding that for every
semiosis, “there obviously are two objects, the object as it is in itself (the monadic object),
and the object as the sign represents it to be (the dyadic object)” and “also three interpretants;
7See also Francisco Morgado et al. [23] and the report [21] on Borgo’s and Kutz’ example scenarios [43].
namely, 1) the interpretant considered as an independent sign of the object, 2) the interpretant
as it is as a fact determined by the sign to be, and 3) the interpretant as it is intended by, or is
represented in, the sign to be” [44, p. 373]. It may be best to understand these multiplicities
as single, unique individuals that are here merely viewed in dierent ways or, alternatively,
as collectives that have multiple members, cf. Section 4.3. However, for some applications it
does help to permit multiple distinct individuals in the same triadic role, e.g., where a step of a
research workow addresses several “objects of research,” cf. Schembera and Iglezakis [11, 12].
Implementing semiotic monism [25] by asserting that anything can act as a representamen
and also as a referent (in dierent contexts), no specic concepts are needed to distinguish
between indviduals that take these roles, since the same entity can occur on both sides of a
representation relation. However, multiple types of cognitive steps need to be distinguished
depending on the roles played by triadic elements and the way in which they are connected to
each other within a cognitive process. Participation in a process, isParticipantIn (denoted P̈),
requires overlap8 (Ṗ
−
Ṗ, see above) and is antireexive
∀𝑥𝑦(P̈𝑥𝑦 → Ṗ−Ṗ𝑥𝑦) ∧ ¬∃𝑥 P̈𝑥𝑥, (15)
∀𝑥(∃𝑦P̈𝑦𝑥 ↔ Process:𝑥), (16)
and the part of the taxonomy that is relevant for the present purpose is given by9
∀𝑥(Process:𝑥 → Item:𝑥) ∧ ∀𝜅(Cognition:𝜅 → Process:𝜅) ∧
∀𝜅(CognitiveStep:𝜅 → Cognition:𝜅) ∧ ∀𝜅(TriadicCognition:𝜅 → CognitiveStep:𝜅) ∧
∀𝜅 ((Perception:𝜅 ∨ Interpretation:𝜅 ∨ Metonymization:𝜅) → TriadicCognition:𝜅) . (17)
The elements that act as a representamen (denoted Ṙ) in a cognitive step 𝜅 are engaged in
representation (R, see above) with the elements that act as a referent (denoted O) in 𝜅
∀𝜅𝑠𝑜
(︁
(Ṙ𝑠𝜅 ∧ O𝑜𝜅) → R𝑠𝑜
)︁
. (18)
In a semiosis, these elements are the sign 𝑠, the object 𝑜, and the interpretant 𝑠′ [38]
∀𝜅𝑠𝑜𝑠′
(︁(︀
3𝜅𝑠𝑜𝑠′ ∧ (Perception:𝜅 ∨ Interpretation:𝜅)
)︀
→ (Ṙ𝑠𝜅 ∧ O𝑜𝜅 ∧ Ṙ𝑠′𝜅)
)︁
, (19)
where 𝑠 and 𝑠′ act as representamina, and 𝑜 is their joint referent: The sign is the input of the
cognitive step, the interpretant is its output, the object is what both are about.
A case distinction is needed for participation of triadic elements in triadic cognitions, by
relation P̈ as introduced above, requiring physical presence and hence spatiotemporal overlap.
Both perceptions and interpretations are semioses; what distinguishes them is whether or not
8In particular, if 𝑥 is included spatially in 𝑦 for some time, but not for all time, it means that 𝑥 and 𝑦 overlap.
By virtue of spatiotemporal monism, there is no dualism of “continuants” (or “endurants”) and “occurrents” (or
“perdurants”); in line with the EMMO, processes are not “perdurants,” and participants are not “endurants.” It is
possible for the same object to be a process and to participate in a process.
9For denitions, cf. the Appendix and the ontology at http://www.molmod.info/semantics/pims-ii.ttl.
the object needs to be present. Representamina need to be present in general, whereas the
referent only needs to participate in a perception
∀𝜅𝑠(Ṙ𝑠𝜅 → P̈𝑠𝜅) ∧ ∀𝜋𝑜
(︁
(O𝑜𝜋 ∧ Perception:𝜋) → P̈𝑜𝜋
)︁
. (20)
In a metonymization [45], a sign 𝑠 that represents 𝑜 is attributed to a new referent 𝑜′
∀𝜇𝑜𝑠𝑜′
(︁
(3𝜇𝑜𝑠𝑜′ ∧Metonymization:𝜇) → (O𝑜𝜇 ∧ Ṙ𝑠𝜇 ∧ O𝑜′𝜇)
)︁
. (21)
Peirce requires a “real, physical connection of a sign with its object, either immediately or by its
connection with another sign” [37]; a sign “must be aected in some way by the object which
it signied or at least something about it must vary as a consequence of a real causation with
some variation of its object” [39]. In particular, permitting the application of signs to contingent
or hypothetical phenomena, Peirce states that a real causal connection is present if a “cause
which precedes the event also precedes some cognition of the mind” [40, p. 142]; therein, the
event (the occurrence of which may be contingent) is the referent, and the common cause is
something that contributes causally to the occurrence of the event and to the cognition by which
the representamen is generated. Accordingly, the “real causal connection” between the referent
and the representamen needs to be preserved, i.e., it must be ensured that the old referent has a
causal connection (hasCausalConnectionWith, denoted Ċ
⋆
) with the new referent
∀𝜇𝑜𝑜′
(︁





is constructed as the reexive and transitive closure of the symmetric and







∃𝑧(Ċ⋆𝑥𝑧 ∧ Ċ𝑧𝑦) ∨ Ċ𝑥𝑦 ∨ 𝑥 = 𝑦
)︁)︁
. (23)
Constitutivity C̈, cf. Axioms (41) and (42), participation P̈, and direct grounding →˓
∀𝑥𝑦
(︁
(C̈𝑥𝑦 ∨ P̈𝑥𝑦 ∨ →˓𝑥𝑦 ∨ Ċ𝑦𝑥) → Ċ𝑥𝑦
)︁
∧ ¬∃𝑥 Ċ𝑥𝑥, (24)
are sucient criteria for the presence of a direct causal connection. Future work might explore
a more coherent formalization of causal connectedness in modal terms [46, 47].
3.2. Epistemic Grounding
Peirce introduces chain formation out of individual triadic cognitions as follows: “the inter-
pretant, or third, cannot stand in a mere dyadic relation to the object, but must stand in such
a relation to it as the [rst] representamen itself does. [...] The third must [...] be capable of
determining a third of its own. [...] All this must equally be true of the third’s thirds and so
on endlessly” [38]. For a conceptual analysis of typical research workows in computational
engineering, cf. Lenhard and Hasse [48, p. 73f.] as well as Lenhard and Küster [3, Section 2];
it is explained in previous work [20] how MODA [16] and OSMO [17] can be mapped to the
EMMO [23, 24] through the PIMS-II mid-level ontology to translate such workows into chains
of Peircean triadic cognitive steps.
When a triadic cognition 𝜅 directlyGrounds another triadic cognition 𝜆, denoted →˓𝜅𝜆, this
means that step 𝜆 reuses a representation relation R𝑠𝑜 from the preceding step 𝜅
∀𝜅𝜆
(︁
(→˓𝜅𝜆 ∧ TriadicCognition:𝜅) → ∃𝑠𝑜(Ṙ𝑠𝜅 ∧ Ṙ𝑠𝜆 ∧ O𝑜𝜅 ∧ O𝑜𝜆)
)︁
, (25)
cf. Fig. 1; for instance, 𝜅 could be a modelling step from which a molecular model 𝑠 for system
𝑜 is obtained as an interpretant, and 𝜆 could be a molecular simulation of system 𝑜 where the
model 𝑠 is used to represent 𝑜. There needs to be a ground10 𝑔𝜆 that represents both 𝜅 and 𝜆,
where 𝑔𝜆 isGroundFor 𝜆, denoted R̈𝑔𝜆𝜆 and subsumed under R
∀𝑔𝜅𝜅(R̈𝑔𝜅𝜅 → R𝑔𝜅𝜅). (26)
In the present example, the ground 𝑔 for 𝜆 could be the assertion that “step 𝜅 epistemically
grounds step 𝜆 by parameterizing the molecular model that is subsequently employed as a
simulation input.” The reasoning according to which one cognitive step grounds another can
itself be given the form of a sequence of cognitive steps; e.g., consider an explanation of how
𝜆 is epistemically grounded, providing a justication for a cognitive process where 𝜅 directly
grounds 𝜆. As in the example above, the grounds 𝑔𝜅 and 𝑔𝜆 then both represent 𝜅. The preceding
ground 𝑔𝜅 comes into existence before the new ground 𝑔𝜆, such that 𝑔𝜅 is the sign and 𝑔𝜆 is the
interpretant in a grounding interpretation ?⃗?𝜆
∀𝜅𝜆
(︁
→˓𝜅𝜆 → ∃?⃗?𝜆𝑔𝜅𝑔𝜆(R̈𝑔𝜅𝜅 ∧ R̈𝑔𝜆𝜆 ∧ 3?⃗?𝜆𝑔𝜅𝜅𝑔𝜆 ∧ Interpretation:?⃗?𝜆)
)︁
, (27)
cf. Fig. 1. The representation relation R𝑔𝜆𝜅 is reused in a grounding metonymization ?⃗?𝜆 by
which 𝑔𝜆 is assigned the grounded step 𝜆 as its new referent by 3?⃗?𝜆𝜅𝑔𝜆𝜆. In general,
∀𝜅𝜆
(︁
→˓𝜅𝜆 → ∃?⃗?𝜆𝑔𝜆(R̈𝑔𝜆𝜆 ∧ 3?⃗?𝜆𝜅𝑔𝜆𝜆 ∧ Metonymization:?⃗?𝜆)
)︁
, (28)
cf. Fig. 1. Ultimately, a triadic cognition is grounded epistemically if there is an accepted
presupposition that logicallyPrecedes it (denoted →˓+) directly or indirectly
∀𝜅
(︁ (︀(︀





(GroundedCognition:𝜅→ Cognition:𝜅) ∧ (Presupposition:𝜅→ CognitiveStep:𝜅)
)︁
, (29)





∃𝜅(→˓+𝜗𝜅 ∧ →˓𝜅𝜆) ∨ →˓𝜗𝜆
)︀)︀
. (30)
10To Peirce [38], a ground is “an idea” that explains how a sign relates to an object. The present use of the
term applies this specically to an explanation that provides epistemic grounding to a cognition, as understood by
Williams: “Epistemic grounding is a matter of reliability. A belief is epistemically grounded [... if and only if] it is
formed via a process that in fact makes it likely to be true” [5]. Similarly, Jubb argues in favour of “distinguishing
between what some position commits one to – logical grounding – and what may be useful in assessing whether







































Figure 1: A cognitive chain consisting of two semioses 𝜅 →˓𝜆 and the associated grounding chain
consisting of a grounding interpretation ?⃗?𝜆 followed by a grounding metonymization ?⃗?𝜆, conforming
with Axioms (25) to (28); concerning diagram notations based on Peircean semiotics, cf. Sowa [41, Fig.
3], Chandler [50, p. 34], Klein et al. [20, Fig. 5], and the supplementary material [21, Figs. 2–4].
4. Relational and Conceptual Framework
4.1. Mereosemiotic Chain Relations
Relations from domain ontologies, which are comparably specic, oen correspond to chains
of top-level relations, which are more generic; as Zhou et al. [51] put it, they can be “used to
‘atten’ the structure of the other ontology by short-cutting a property chain.” Since the OWL
description logic 𝒮ℛ𝒪ℐ𝒬 only permits one-way chain inclusions [52], in what is usually the
wrong direction to implement the alignment, it can be useful if constructs for chains out of
generic relations are explicitly included in a foundational or mid-level ontology to facilitate an
alignment. Here, these abstract relations are Ṗ (isProperPartOf), R (isRepresentamenFor), and
their inverse relations. Accordingly, the PIMS-II mid-level ontology includes the mereosemiotic
chain relations that were introduced in previous work when the VIMMP domain ontologies
were aligned with the EMMO; these relations were found to be helpful or even necessary in
many cases [18, Chapter 5]. The present system of chain relations is thus constituted by the




∃𝑧(Q𝑥𝑧 ∧ Q′𝑧𝑦) ↔ QQ′𝑥𝑦
)︀
, (31)
and inverse chains are obtained by (QQ′)− ≡ (Q′)−Q−, i.e., for any Q1, ...,Q𝑛 ∈ M
∀𝑥𝑦(Q1 · · ·Q𝑛𝑥𝑦 ↔ Q𝑛− · · ·Q1−𝑦𝑥). (32)
As a consequence of the strong mereotopology from Section 2.2, an implementation of the
mereosemiotic chain relations can disregard many combinations of elements that are equivalent
11For the OWL implementation, the following naming convention is employed: The binary product relations
are called overlapsWith (Ṗ
−
Ṗ), sharesReferentWith (RR−), and sharesRepresentamenWith (R−R). The names for
higher-order product relations begin with the prexms (for “mereosemiotics”), followed by the elements IP for “is
proper part of,” HP for “has proper part,” IR for “is representamen for,” and HR for “has representamen.” In this







Figure 2: Fragment of the system of mereosemiotic relations; arrows denote relational subsumption.
or redundant. For Q,Q′ ∈ M⋆, it follows from Axioms (4), (6), and (31) that
∀𝑥𝑦(QṖ2Q′𝑥𝑦 ↔ QṖQ′𝑥𝑦),
so that chains containing the factor Ṗ
2
need not be considered; the same applies to Ṗ
−2
. Similarly,
any chains containing the “underlap” factor ṖṖ
−





Q′𝑥𝑦 ↔ (∃𝑦′Q𝑥𝑦′ ∧ ∃𝑥′Q′𝑥′𝑦)
)︁
,
where Q,Q′ ∈ M⋆, since ṖṖ− ≡ ⊤Q, cf. Section 2.2; therefore, any elementary proposition on
QṖṖ
−
Q′ can be replaced with a conjunction over two separate existential propositions on Q
and Q′ (which remain expressible in 𝒮ℛ𝒪ℐ𝒬 description logic) so that it is not necessary to
include an explicit declaration of QṖṖ
−
Q′ in the ontology. By construction
∀𝑥𝑦(Q1Q2Q3𝑥𝑦 → Q1Q2Q2−Q2Q3𝑥𝑦),
for all Q1,Q2,Q3 ∈ M⋆, and from mereotopology
∀𝑥𝑦(QQ′𝑥𝑦 → QṖ−ṖQ′𝑥𝑦),
∀𝑥𝑦(QṖQ′𝑥𝑦 → QṖ−ṖQ′𝑥𝑦) ∧ ∀𝑥𝑦(QṖ−Q′𝑥𝑦 → QṖ−ṖQ′𝑥𝑦),
for anyQ,Q′ ∈ M⋆, since Ṗ−Ṗ is reexive and Ṗ and Ṗ− are subrelations of Ṗ−Ṗ, cf. Section 2.2,
yielding a dense hierarchy of relational subsumptions overM⋆, cf. Fig. 2.
4.2. Absolute and Qualified Necessity
The present ontology permits the application of modal operators a) to relations, by which
necessary and possible relations □Q and ♢Q can be constructed from a relation Q, and b) to
rules, yielding laws as rules of the type □(𝜙 → 𝜓), where 𝜙 and 𝜓 are propositions. Beside
qualied modal operators □𭟋 and ♢𭟋, which require a descriptor of the applicable modal
context 𭟋, it includes absolute necessity and possibility □ and ♢, which are free of context. The
absolute operators satisfy the S5 axioms of modal logic
𝜙 ⇒ □♢𝜙, (33)
□𝜙 ⇒ (𝜙 ∧ □□𝜙), (34)
□(𝜙 → 𝜓) ⇒ (□𝜙 → □𝜓), (35)
where 𝜙 and 𝜓 are propositions. Motivated by the construction from Section 2.1, where the
domain is necessarily 𝛥 (understood here as absolute necessity), necessitism is applied; i.e.,
the existence of an object is a matter of absolute necessity [27]
∀𝑥 □∃𝑦 (𝑥 = 𝑦), (36)
and the Barcan formula [27, 53] holds for any proposition 𝜙 with the free variables x
♢∃x𝜙 ⇒ ∃x♢𝜙. (37)
All existing objects exist necessarily because they are here dened as spatiotemporal entities and
the spatiotemporal extension of the domain𝛥 is regarded as an absolute necessity; contingency
is thereby shied to the relations between objects. This does not mean that counterfactual
propositions need to be absolutely impossible, or that it becomes impossible to speak of contin-
gent phenomena – quite the opposite: This construction is introduced here precisely to solve
the paradox that contingent situations (including multiple mutually contradictory scenarios,
as in an optimization) can occur as referents in actually occurring cognitive processes [25,
Section 3.2]. In such cases, it is safe to say that, e.g., a model 𝑠 of an undesirable event 𝑜, with
the representation relation R𝑠𝑜, does retain an actually existing referent even if we hope or
assume that the event as such will not occur; the spatiotemporal existence of 𝑜 is nonetheless a
necessity.
By the same line of reasoning,mereotopological essentialism is supported12
∀𝑥𝑦 ((♢C𝑥𝑦 → □C𝑥𝑦) ∧ (♢→˓t𝑥𝑦 → □→˓t𝑥𝑦)) . (38)
Analogous rules can then be deduced for all mereotopological relations, including Ṗ, ≤̇ , and
≡t, and for the instantiation of the mereotopologically dened concept Item, so that
∀𝑥(♢Item:𝑥 → □ Item:𝑥).
The OWL implementation of PIMS-II [21] realizes modal relations in terms of assertions about
the IRIs of the relations, i.e., using individuals that instantiate the concept IRI; in a similar way, a
12Varzi refers to this as “a radical form of mereotopological essentialism” [54, p. 1017]. Chisholm [55, p. 145.]
and Plantinga [56] speak of “mereological essentialism,” which unproblematically extends from parthood to con-
nectivity and hence from mereology to mereotopology; however, Chisholm and Plantinga employ constructions
based on possible worlds and temporal slicing, neither of which is done here, which makes it easier to capture
mereotopological essentialism by a simple expression such as Axiom (38).
relation can be asserted to be the negation ¬Q of another relationQ. To dene laws, Proposition
objects are employed, which have Triple objects (i.e., RDF triples that are reied as PIMS-II
articulations) as semiotic members, cf. Section 4.3. This permits applying PIMS-II to encode
propositions that go beyond the expressive power of OWL DL. Ongoing work on RDF-star [57]
suggests that in the future, there will be a new recommendation for the reication of triples,
which might then be employed instead.
The relation between absolute and qualied modes of necessity is not straightforward to
characterize in general, and no such attempt is made in the present work. Multiple modal
frameworks are a requirement for addressing problems such as those posed by McCarthy [58], or
hypercontingency (“it may be possible” to construct a warp drive, but it may also be impossible)
as discussed by Kaminski [59, p. 351f.]. Qualied necessity can go beyond absolute necessity;
e.g., it was not absolutely necessary for Trump to lose reelection, but to a knowledge base that
holds this information, it is epistemically necessary. On the other hand, qualied possibility
can go beyond absolute possibility: If Jones 𝑗 and Lewis ℓ, who have never met before, will
meet in the future and shake hands, their overall spacetime trajectories are connected, C𝑗ℓ,
which is then absolutely necessary, □C𝑗ℓ, due to mereotopological essentialism; however, since
we do not know whether that will happen and are therefore unaware of the shape of 𝑗 and ℓ,
appropriate use can be made of the qualied modal proposition ¬□𭟋C𝑗ℓ in an adequate context.
4.3. System of Collective Objects
Mereotopology includes the concept of a mereotopological collective, i.e., a spacetime object
that is not connected as a whole and is decomposed into maximal connected components, its
members, which are items and which are related to the associated collective by the relation
≤̇ (isMereotopologicalMemberOf), cf. Axiom (7). However, the practical use of this EMMO
construction for annotating research data is far too limited to be sucient [25, Section 3.1].
Jones 𝑗 and Lewis ℓ from the example above (Section 4.2) might never meet during their lifetime:
Then they are spatiotemporally disconnected from each other, ¬C𝑗ℓ, and their fusion 𝑜 (with
𝜎𝑜𝑗ℓ) has two members, ≤̇ 𝑗𝑜 and ≤̇ ℓ𝑜. Or they might meet and shake hands, in which case
their fusion becomes one item. We do not know which is the case, and if we did, it would still
require us to handle dierent pairs of people dierently depending on irrelevant circumstantial
phenomena.
A viable ontology that deals with research data requires additional kinds of collectives. Here,
in line with the general structure of the present approach, SemioticCollective individuals (to
which their members are related by ≤̈ , isSemioticMemberOf) are introduced to complement
the MereotopologicalCollective individuals (objects of the relation ≤̇ ) such that generally,
Collective individuals (objects of ≤) have at least two members
∀𝑥 (∃𝑦≤𝑦𝑥 → ∃𝑦𝑧(≤𝑦𝑥 ∧ ≤𝑧𝑥 ∧ 𝑦 ̸= 𝑧)) , (39)
∀𝑥𝑦
(︀
(≤̇ 𝑥𝑦 ∨ ≤̈ 𝑥𝑦) → ≤𝑥𝑦
)︀
∧ ∀𝑥𝑦(≤𝑥𝑦 → Ṗ𝑥𝑦), (40)
whereby membership is subsumed under proper parthood. It is common to classify collectives
into dierent kinds depending on how their components or members interact or are assembled
into a whole; e.g., Masolo et al. [60] propose three types: Pluralities like “Alice and Bob,” proper
collectives (e.g., forests or organizations), and composites “that have another sort of internal
structure” [60]. Canavotto and Giordani [61] distinguish between heaplike and non-heaplike
collectives, e.g., contrasting “a bunch of puzzle pieces” (heaplike) against “one puzzle made of
those pieces” [61]. Semiotic collectives are characterized by joint action as a representational
element, i.e., as a referent or representamen; PIMS-II distinguishes the following four kinds of
semiotic collectives:
1. In a Plurality 𝑥, the members 𝑦 (with ◁p𝑦𝑥) appear together as one representational
element, all contributing to this eect in the same way; the members of a plurality can be
anything other than another plurality or a structure.
2. In a Structure 𝑥, the members 𝑦 (with ≺𝑦𝑥) constitute one representational element, but
all in dierent roles; anything except structures can be a member of a structure.13
3. In an Articulation 𝑥, to which its members are related by ◁r𝑦𝑥 (“𝑦 realizes 𝑥”), dierent
realizations of a single representational element are grouped together; e.g., copies of
the same data item on dierent computers, multiple ways of denoting or encoding the
same molecular model, or spoken utterances and written versions of the Lord’s Prayer in
dierent languages can be grouped together into articulations. The realizations (members)
of an articulation cannot include any semiotic collectives.
4. A Proposition 𝜙 has articulations 𝑥 as its members, denoted ◁a𝑥𝜙 (“𝑥 articulates 𝜙”);
this construction is to be employed whenever there are several ways in which the same
propositional content was expressed and it is this shared semantic and/or pragmatic
content that is relevant, rather than the exact way in which it was stated.
Following the paradigm of semiotic monism, no distinction is made between collectives that
appear as a referent or a representamen. Membership is further generalized to constitutivity
(denoted C̈), cf. Axiom (23), which requires spatiotemporal overlap, and to underlying (denoted
C̈
+
), the transitive closure of C̈, which is antireexive





𝑥𝑦 ↔ (∃𝑧(C̈+𝑥𝑧 ∧ C̈𝑧𝑦) ∨ C̈𝑥𝑦)
)︁
∧ ¬∃𝑥 C̈+𝑥𝑥; (42)
e.g., the articulations “200” and “kPa” are constitutive of the articulation “200 kPa.” This relation
cannot be subsumed under proper parthood, since realizations of the same articulation “200” are
proper parts of realizations of other articulations, such as “200 K,” that are disjoint with “200 kPa.”
It is le open whether constitutivity is reducible to a construction involving modal relations;
work by Vogt [62] suggests that this is challenging, since there are many ways in which one
object may be constitutive of another.
5. Conclusion
Arndt et al. observe that it is “very common for standardization bodies on all levels (regional,
super-regional, international) oen to provide an inconsistent, ambiguous set of concepts,
13Pluralities are permitted as members of structures, to be employed as follows: If 𝑎 and 𝑏 contribute to the
appearance of a structure as a referent or a representamen in the same way, while 𝑐 contributes in a dierent way,
the structure has two members. First, the plurality of 𝑎 and 𝑏; second, 𝑐.
terms, and denitions. This is especially true for subjects that are relevant in a wide range of
domains” [63]. Ontology-based data technology aims at improving consistency, and facilitating
a uniform understanding of basic cross-domain concepts is a task that is usually attributed
to foundational ontologies. To achieve this goal, it is necessary to provide a formalization
of the underlying ontological paradigm, going beyond description logic which is insucient
to express many typical axioms. Mereotopology in combination with Peircean semiotics, or
mereosemiotics, is an ontological paradigm that is already in use by one foundational ontology
(EMMO [23, 24]), mid-level ontologies including PIMS-II [20, 21], and a great number of domain
ontologies, e.g., the eight domain ontologies from the Virtual Materials Marketplace (VIMMP)
project [18] the ontologies mentioned by Francisco Morgado et al. [23], and many more that are
being developed in projects funded from the Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme.
Despite the uptake of this ontological paradigm in data management practice, there is little
literature so far on the interaction between spatiotemporal parthood/connectedness on the
one hand and cognitive processes consisting of Peircean triads on the other hand; none, to
the knowledge of the author, includes an axiomatization comparable to that of the paradigms
underlying other foundational ontologies. Addressing this challenge, the axiomatization of
the core parts of PIMS-II in modal rst-order logic, given in the present work,14 provides
mereosemiotics with an unambiguous formalization. While the present axiomatization does
not entail four-dimensionalism, it is consistent with it; thereby, it species a coherent approach
to integrating semiotics with four-dimensionalism and nominalism (strongly rejected by Peirce,
but enforced by the EMMO). By this approach, research data provenance can be denoted in terms
of cognitive processes, e.g., experimental procedures or simulation workows, documenting
the reliability and supporting the FAIRness of data that are made available on research data
infrastructures.
Supplementary information is made openly accessible through Zenodo [21, 64].
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Appendix: List of Concepts
The following PIMS-II concepts are directly relevant to this work:
• Articulation: A semiotic collective 𝑥 such that ∃𝑦 ◁r𝑦𝑥. the realizations 𝑦 of a single articula-
tion 𝑥 can include literal (written or digital) and non-literal (e.g., spoken) versions; taxonomy:
Articulation ⊑ SemioticCollective.
• Cognition: Process in which signs represent objects; taxonomy: Cognition ⊑ Process.
• CognitiveStep: Elementary cognition (e.g., a triad); taxonomy: CognitiveStep ⊑ Cognition.
• Collective: Anything that has members (an 𝑥 with ∃𝑦≤𝑦𝑥); taxonomy: Collective ⊑ Object.
• GroundedCognition: Cognition that is logically preceded by a Presupposition, cf. Axiom (29);
taxonomy: GroundedCognition ⊑ Cognition.
• Interpretation: Semiosis that does not require the object to participate and be present physically;
taxonomy: Interpretation ⊑ Semiosis.
• Item: Connected component of spacetime, cf. Axiom (8); taxonomy: Item ⊑ Object.
• MereotopologicalCollective: Anything that is not an Item, i.e., any 𝑥 such that ∃𝑦 ≤̇ 𝑦𝑥; taxon-
omy: MereotopologicalCollective ⊑ Collective.
• Metonymization: Semantic change that satises Axiom (22) such that there is a “real causal
connection” [40, p. 142], Ċ
⋆
𝑜𝑜′, between the old referent 𝑜 and the new referent 𝑜′; taxonomy:
Metonymization ⊑ SemanticChange.
• Object: All that exists is an Object.
• Perception: Semiosis that requires the object to participate and be present physically, cf. Ax-
iom (20); taxonomy: Perception ⊑ Semiosis.
• Plurality: A semiotic collective 𝑥 such that ∃𝑦 ◁p𝑦𝑥. Members 𝑦 of a plurality 𝑥 engage in
representation jointly, all in the same way or role; taxonomy: Plurality ⊑ SemioticCollective.
• Presupposition: Anchor point for epistemic grounding – some previous cognitive step that is not
subject to further scrutiny; taxonomy: Presupposition ⊑ CognitiveStep.
• Process: Connected region (Item) in which one or multiple objects participate (have a role), i.e.,
any 𝑥 such that ∃𝑦 P̈𝑦𝑥 is a Process, cf. Axiom (16); taxonomy: Process ⊑ Item.
• Proposition: A semiotic collective 𝜙 such that ∃𝑥 ◁a𝑥𝜙. The members of a proposition 𝜙 are
articulations that express some joint semantic and/or pragmatic content, namely 𝜙; taxonomy:
Proposition ⊑ SemioticCollective.
• SemanticChange: Cognitive step with the structure old referent – sign – new referent as in Ax-
iom (21), cf. Paradis [45]; taxonomy: SemanticChange ⊑ TriadicCognition.
• Semiosis: Cognitive step with the structure sign – object – interpretant following Peirce [38],
cf. Axiom (19); taxonomy: Semiosis ⊑ TriadicCognition.
• SemioticCollective: An 𝑥 with ∃𝑦 ≤̈ 𝑦𝑥, i.e., a collective that acts jointly as a representational
element (i.e., representamen or referent); taxonomy: SemioticCollective ⊑ Collective.
• Structure: A semiotic collective 𝑥 such that ∃𝑦 ≺𝑦𝑥. The members 𝑦 of a structure 𝑥 engage
in representation together, but all contributing in dierent ways or roles; taxonomy: Structure ⊑
SemioticCollective.
• TriadicCognition: Cognitive step that is constituted by the interaction between three elements,
i.e., any 𝜅 such that ∃𝑒1𝑒2𝑒3 3𝜅𝑒1𝑒2𝑒3; taxonomy: TriadicCognition ⊑ CognitiveStep.
Appendix: List of Relations
The following PIMS-II relations are directly relevant to this work:
name (IRI sux and label) symbol hierarchy
articulates ◁a ⊑ ≤̈
directlyGrounds →˓ ⊑ Ċ ⊓ →˓+
hasCausalConnectionWith Ċ
⋆ ⊑ ⊤Q
hasDirectCausalConnectionWith Ċ ⊑ Ċ⋆
hasProperPart Ṗ
− ⊑ Ṗ−Ṗ
hasRepresentamen R− ⊑ Ṗ−ṖR− ⊓ R−Ṗ−Ṗ ⊓ R−RR−, cf. Fig. 2
isConstitutiveOf C̈ ⊑ Ċ ⊓ Ṗ−Ṗ ⊓ C̈+
isFirstElementIn Ė ⊑ E
isFusionOf 𝜎 (relates an Object to an rdf:List)
isGroundFor R̈ ⊑ R
isImproperPartOf P ⊑ Ṗ−Ṗ
isMemberOf ≤ ⊑ C̈ ⊓ Ṗ
isMemberOfPlurality ◁p ⊑ ≤̈
isMemberOfStructure ≺ ⊑ ≤̈
isMereosemioticallyRelatedTo ⊤Q (complete relation, equivalent to C2 and ṖṖ
−
)
isMereotopologicalMemberOf ≤̇ ⊑ ≤
isParticipantIn P̈ ⊑ Ṗ−Ṗ ⊓ Ċ
isProperPartOf Ṗ ⊑ P ⊓ ≡tṖ
isReferentIn O ⊑ E
isRepresentamenFor R ⊑ RṖ−Ṗ ⊓ Ṗ−ṖR ⊓ RR−R
isRepresentamenIn Ṙ ⊑ E ⊓ P̈
isRepresentationalElementIn E ⊑ ⊤Q
isSecondElementIn Ë ⊑ E
isSemioticMemberOf ≤̈ ⊑ ≤
isSpatiotemporallyConnectedWith C ⊑ ≡tC
isSpatiotemporallyDisconnectedFrom ¬C ⊑ ¬Ṗ−Ṗ
isTemporallyConnectedWith ≡tC ⊑ ⊤Q






isTriadOf 3 (relates a TriadicCognition to an rdf:List)
logicallyPrecedes →˓+ ⊑ →˓t ⊓ Ċ
⋆
realizes ◁r ⊑ ≤̈
sharesReferentWith RR− ⊑ RR−Ṗ−Ṗ ⊓ Ṗ−ṖRR−
sharesRepresentamenWith R−R ⊑ R−RṖ−Ṗ ⊓ Ṗ−ṖR−R
temporallyCoextendsWith ≡t ⊑ ≡tṖ
−
Ṗ













(For descriptions cf. http://www.molmod.info/semantics/pims-ii.ttl.)
